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ABSTRACT
Local differential privacy (LDP) is an emerging privacy standard
to protect individual user data. One scenario where LDP can be
applied is federated learning, where each user sends in his/her user
gradients to an aggregator who uses these gradients to perform
stochastic gradient descent. In a case where the aggregator is un-
trusted and LDP is not applied to each user gradient, the aggregator
can recover sensitive user data from these gradients. In this paper,
we present a new interactive web demo showcasing the power of lo-
cal differential privacy by visualizing federated learning with local
differential privacy. Moreover, the live demo shows how LDP can
prevent untrusted aggregators from recovering sensitive training
data. A measure called the exp-hamming recovery is also created to
show the extent of how much data the aggregator can recover.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→Distributed systems security; •Com-
puting methodologies → Supervised learning by classification;
Supervised learning by regression.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Local differential privacy
Local differential privacy is an emerging model based on differen-
tial privacy where each record or tuple in a database, even when
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exposed to adversaries (which could include the data curator or
aggregator), does not give the selected user’s sensitive information
to them. Hence even the data curator or aggregator is not trusted
with true information from each entry in the dataset. Local dif-
ferential privacy was first implemented by Google in its RAPPOR
technology in their paper in [4].
Local differential privacy (ϵ-LDP) [4] is defined as follows:
Definition 1. A random function f satisfies ϵ-local differential
privacy if and only if, for any two tuples t and t ‘ in the domain of f ,
and for any output t∗ of f :
Pr [f (t) = t∗] ≤ eϵ × Pr [f (t ‘) = t∗]
where parameter ϵ controls the privacy-utility trade-off (the higher
the ϵ , the higher the tuple utility and the lower the tuple privacy).
Many companies store enterprise data in relational form with
RDBMS software. For example, Airbnb and Uber store their data
using mySQL [1]; Netflix and Instagram store their data using
PostgreSQL [2]. Data stored in this relational form come in a set of
tuples or records with the same schema. Each tuple or record have
the same number of ‘dimensions’ or rows. LDP-perturbed data can
hence also be stored in these relational forms.
Methods to perturb this multidimensional data to satisfy ϵ-LDP
have been proposed, including Duchi et al.’s recent proposal in
[3] and Wang’s improved proposal (the Piecewise Mechanism and
Hybrid Mechanism) in [5]. These methods will be used in the web
demo outlined in subsequent sections of the paper.
1.2 Local differential privacy applied in
federated learning
One practical application for local differential privacy is in ma-
chine learning algorithms, particularly in federated or centralized
distributed learning. As illustrated in Fig. 1, each user is consid-
ered a node that trains gradients independently; each node then
sends these gradients to the parameter server for aggregation [6].
The data that these users make use of to obtain user gradients is
sensitive information and should not be leaked.
It can be shown in the subsequent web demo that without local
differential privacy, a significant portion of the training data could
be leaked by the untrusted aggregator in any federated learning
setting where each user submits their gradients for training.
2 DEMO OVERVIEW
A web user interface (called ldp-machine-learning) is created to
simulate stochastic gradient descent in federated learning, and for
the aggregator to recover training data from each user. A screenshot
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Figure 1: Federated learning flowchart
of the demo is shown in Fig. 2 and the demo is publicly available in
https://ldp-machine-learning.herokuapp.com/.
Figure 2: Screenshot of ldp-machine-learning demo
In the demo, when all users fill in the training data and the Train
button is started, one epoch of stochastic gradient descent takes
place. Unbeknownst to the ‘users’ illustrated in the GUI, the aggre-
gator uses the gradients from the user and the current parameters
of the model to backtrack and recover the training user data, which
poses a security risk. Features of the UI are outlined in the next
section.
2.1 Animation and animation speed
The main animation in the demo occurs when the Train and Re-
cover buttons are clicked. When the Train button is clicked, training
proceeds and the current cost or training accuracy of the machine
learning model is shown beside each user sending his or her gradi-
ents to the aggregator. When training is finished, the final model
cost and accuracy are outputted on screen. When the Recover but-
ton is clicked, the untrusted aggregator attempts to recover sensitive
user training data from the gradients sent by each user. At the end of
recovery, the average exp-hamming recovery for a user is outputted
on screen. Normally, the training and recovery animation occurs
at a rate of one user per second; however, changing the Training
Animation Speed input from “1 record / second” to “Instant” in the
UI input form will remove the animation and immediately display
training and recovery results when training finishes.
2.2 Machine learning algorithms and LDP
perturbation mechanisms
The demo features federated learning with various machine learn-
ing algorithms such as linear regression, logistic regression and
support vector machine, which can be toggled, as shown in Fig. 3.
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 3, the LDP perturbation mechanism
to perturb user gradients can be toggled from 4 options: Laplace
mechanism, Duchi et al. mechanism, Piecewise mechanism and
Hybrid mechanism; the privacy budget ϵ of the LDP algorithm can
also be toggled.
Figure 3: Toggling between different ML algorithms, LDP
algorithms and privacy budgets
2.3 Other features and specifications
An ’Add 10 Users’ button and an ’Add 100 Users’ button were added
to automatically generate new training data. A scroll up button
from the bottom page is added for easier navigation. The buttons
are shown in Fig. 4.
Figure 4: The add users and scroll up buttons
Each user’s training data is generated via the following equation:
d = −0.55x1 − 0.82x2 + 0.07x3 + 0.95x4 + 0.31
for linear regression. For logistic regression and SVM it is:
d =
{
1, i f − 0.55x1 − 0.82x2 + 0.07x3 + 0.95x4 + 0.31 > 0
−1,otherwise
From these two equations, the ideal weights for the model are
[−0.55,−0.82, 0.07, 0.95, 0.31]. The closer the model weights are to
the ideal weights, the better the model is. Initial model weights
and training data are generated with a pseudorandom seed via an
extension in the JavaScript Math library.
2.4 Exp-hamming recovery
Before the formal definition of the exp-hamming recovery is dis-
cussed, it is imperative to identify what it means when it is “more
difficult” for an aggregator to recover user training data. Consider
a user’s training data to be the vector #»x = (x1,x2, ...,xn ) with n
dimensions. Now consider an aggregator’s recovered training data
to be the vector #»xr = (x1r ,x2r , ·,xnr ). The natural convention is
that it is more difficult to recover #»x if #»xr is farther from #»x . Hence
a distance metric is needed; naturally, the higher the value of this
metric is, the more difficult it is for an aggregator to recover the
user’s training data. Manhattan distance (ℓ1-norm) is the distance
metric used for the definition of the exp-hamming recovery.
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The exp-hamming recovery is designed so that the more (respec-
tively less) difficult it is for the aggregator for recover training data,
the lower (respectively higher) the exp-hamming recovery should
be. The exp-hamming recovery is hence formally defined as follows:
E = exp(−k(∥ #»x − #»xr ∥1)
where k is a customizable constant (its value is important for ac-
curate interpretation), and ∥· ∥1 represents the Manhattan distance.
This metric naturally makes sense because, if #»x = #»xr , there is full
recovery of user training data, meaning that E = 1. If ∥ #»x − #»xr ∥1 = ∞,
meaning that #»x and #»xr are infinitely apart, there is no information
gained by the aggregator of what the user training data is like,
meaning that E = 0. One can choose a value of k such that E <
1/e ≈ 0.368 should the Manhattan distance ∥ #»x − #»xr ∥1 > 1/k . This
critical value 0.368 for exp-hamming recovery would hence be a
good heuristic to whether the aggregator has enough data to be
able to make a good guess at the user’s real training data or not. In
the demo, the value of k used is 0.5.
2.5 Privacy budget allocation and training
specifications
For privacy budget management in each user, the privacy budget
is allocated equally to each gradient value. Since there are 5 total
values to perturb in the demo, if the privacy budget allocated to each
user is ϵ each of these values are perturbed with privacy budget
ϵ/5 For training, for all the machine learning algorithms, stochastic
gradient descent proceeds at a constant learning rate of α = 0.01.
A feature to customize this learning rate may be added to a later
version of the demo, but the customization of this hyperparameter
is not necessary at this stage.
3 IMPLEMENTATION
Fig. 5 shows the architecture diagram for the web UI, which shows
that the site’s UI and main logic operate entirely on the front-end.
This is to eliminate the latency from API calls to a backend server,
which would slow down the site performance. In addition to that,
the UML State Diagram for the UI is shown in Fig. 6.
The development library used for the frontend is React, an open-
source JavaScript library. Throughout development, a conscious
effort is made to separate the part of the application corresponding
to its appearance and to its logic. The appearance is maintained
within the project’s ‘components/’ directory, while the site logic
lies mainly in the ‘utils/’ directory. The version control system for
the project is git and project code is stored on GitHub. Moreover,
the demo is deployed and served on Heroku, a cloud platform-as-a-
service.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a web GUI is made to illustrate the above results and
the power of locally differentially private mechanisms to perturb
data. The demo is publicly accessible so potential researchers in the
field of differential privacy are able to understand local differential
privacy in the context of applying it in machine learning algorithms.
The GUI is easily extensible to othermachine learning algorithms
and LDP perturbation mechanisms in future work. Moreover, train-
ing hyperparameters such as batch size and learning rates can be
Figure 5: Software architecture diagram for
ldp-machine-learning
Figure 6: UML State Machine Diagram from
ldp-machine-learning
added to the demo for better training results that nearly match
experimental setups with real datasets.
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